

# DAO Governance in the POLIS Framework: A Technical Implementation Guide

## Introduction

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) offer a new paradigm for community governance – one that is transparent, participatory, and encoded in software rather than confined to traditional institutions. In the **POLIS civilizational framework**, a modern reinterpretation of the ancient *polis* (city-state), DAO-based governance is a cornerstone for enabling self-organizing communities at scale. This guide provides a comprehensive, *25-page* technical implementation roadmap for integrating DAOs into POLIS systems. It is written for developers, implementers, and technical architects who seek to deploy or integrate DAO structures in a POLIS context. The tone is clear and pragmatic yet maintains a visionary outlook aligned with POLIS’s ambitious goals of decentralized, human-centric civilization.

**Scope and Structure:** We will explore a *modular, multi-layer DAO architecture* that mirrors the POLIS structure from the ground up. This includes:

- **Role-based DAOs within a Polis:** how individual roles or departments inside a single Polis (city-state) can operate as DAOs, derived from Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) workflows.
- **Polis-level DAOs:** city-wide governance DAOs for legislation and executive functions of the Polis.
- **Inter-Polis (Global) DAOs:** federated DAOs that connect multiple Polises to tackle shared challenges and global coordination.
- **Onboarding DAO for New Polises:** a specialized process for integrating new city-states into the POLIS network via decentralized governance.
- **Legislative Forking System:** an innovative approach to law-making where laws are managed like open-source code (in version-controlled repositories), enabling Polises to “fork” legal codes, propose changes (via pull request-style proposals), and record governance evolution in a global law repository.
- **DAO Frameworks Evaluation:** a technical comparison of leading DAO frameworks – **Aragon**, **MolochDAO**, **DAOstack**, **Gnosis Safe (with Zodiac modules)**, and **Colony** – focusing on interoperability, self-sovereignty, user experience (UX), and compatibility with BPMN-modeled processes.

- **Architecture Diagrams & Workflows:** technical diagrams and patterns illustrating how these DAO layers and components interact (on-chain and off-chain), including smart contract relationships, data flows, and integration with process management tools.
- **Use Case Examples:** concrete scenarios demonstrating how DAOs function in practice within POLIS, such as a Resource Allocation DAO for budgeting, an Emergency Response DAO for crisis coordination, an Ancestral Healing DAO for cultural initiatives, and a Commons Funding DAO for public goods.

By the end of this guide, readers should have both a high-level conceptual understanding and a low-level technical grasp of implementing DAO governance in the POLIS framework. All design choices are justified with current best practices and lessons learned from real-world DAO deployments.

## Modular DAO Governance Architecture in POLIS

POLIS envisions a network of autonomous but interconnected communities (*Neo-Polises* or modern city-states) that govern themselves democratically while collaborating globally. To enable this, governance is structured in *layers*, each implemented by modular DAOs tailored to the appropriate scope. This modular approach ensures decisions are made at the right level – local matters in local DAOs, city-wide policies in Polis DAOs, and global issues in inter-Polis DAOs – yet all layers remain interoperable. The result is a *DAO of DAOs* architecture: smaller DAOs roll up into larger ones, creating a resilient network rather than a monolith.

Key design principles for this architecture include **decentralization**, **transparency**, and **subsidiarity** (each issue handled at the most local level capable). All governance actions – from budget allocations to law changes – are recorded on an open ledger, making corruption or backroom deals nearly impossible. Below we detail each layer of this architecture:

### Role-Based DAOs Within a Polis (Micro-DAOs)

Inside a single Polis, day-to-day operations can be decentralized by creating **role-based DAOs** for various functions, teams, or civic roles. This concept draws from **BPMN process modeling**: in a BPMN diagram of city governance, swimlanes represent roles or departments, and decision gateways represent points that require consensus. Each such role or process can be implemented as a **micro-DAO**, giving the people (or algorithms) in that role a structured way to make decisions and execute tasks.

For example, consider a Polis's public health department modeled in BPMN: it might have roles like Clinic Manager, Supply Coordinator, and Community Health Workers. Instead of a single boss making decisions, each role could operate a DAO: the **Clinic Manager DAO** might vote on clinic policies, the **Supply DAO** could manage medicine inventory via proposals, and a **Health Worker DAO** might collectively schedule community programs. These role-DAOs remain small and focused, but they interface with each other as defined by the BPMN workflow (e.g. a proposal approved in the Supply DAO could automatically trigger a task for the Health DAO). Smart contracts can encode these workflows so that inter-DAO messages or token transfers mirror the BPMN sequence flows.

**BPMN-Derived Structure:** The BPMN model provides a blueprint – tasks become on-chain transactions or off-chain actions, decision points become proposals to be voted on, and swimlane roles become the DAO membership boundaries. This alignment ensures that the DAO governance doesn't operate in a vacuum; it's directly derived from well-defined business processes. It also aids in onboarding and documentation: stakeholders can literally *see* the process diagram of how a role-based DAO feeds into the larger system.

From a technical standpoint, these micro-DAOs could be instantiated using lightweight DAO frameworks (or even multi-signature wallets for very small groups). The emphasis is on ease of use and **low overhead**, since these are operational teams. For instance, using a Gnosis Safe with a voting module (like Snapshot + SafeSnap) could be sufficient for a small committee DAO: proposals are discussed off-chain, and a Safe transaction is executed when quorum is reached. This gives each role both autonomy and accountability – decisions are traceable on-chain, and funds or permissions are controlled by the group, not a single boss. In essence, **every key role becomes a self-governing unit** that can adapt quickly and transparently.

Importantly, **self-sovereignty** at this micro level means each role-based DAO can't be easily overridden by higher authorities without due process. The code (smart contracts) enforces the rules of engagement. As Philippe Honigman notes, a true DAO runs on rules that no outside party can unilaterally change – it achieves a degree of *autonomy* and *self-ownership* in that its behavior is governed by immutable code and the collective will of its members. This principle ensures that even at the lowest level, governance in a Polis is resilient to coercion or corruption: no mayor or minister can secretly alter a department's budget if the budget is managed by a DAO with on-chain rules.

## Polis-Level DAOs for City Governance

At the level of an entire Polis (city-state), we establish a **Polis DAO** – effectively the city's decentralized government. This is where legislation, high-level policy, and citywide resource management occur. All verified citizens of the Polis are typically members (or represented via tokens or delegates) in this DAO. The Polis DAO can be thought of as the successor to a city council or parliament, but operating via smart contracts and open participation.

The Polis DAO handles proposals that affect the whole community: passing local laws, setting budgets for city projects, electing or nominating officials (who might actually be *smart contract* controllers rather than traditional officials), and ratifying changes to the Polis's charter. In practice, proposals would be submitted to a blockchain-based platform (the governance dApp), where citizens can debate and then vote. The **CityDAO** concept described by futurists is instructive: an online platform where proposals are posted and all citizens debate and vote, with certain major proposals requiring special quorums or supermajority approval. For instance, an amendment to the Polis constitution might need 75% approval and a 1-month deliberation period, ensuring stability and thoughtful governance.

To make large-scale direct democracy feasible, innovative voting mechanisms can be employed. The Polis DAO could use **quadratic voting** to let citizens express the intensity of their preferences, or **holographic consensus** (pioneered by DAOstack) to manage a high throughput of proposals by boosting those with merit so they get the community's attention. Such mechanisms prevent governance gridlock and help surface the proposals that people care most about. The Polis DAO smart contracts can enforce these rules – e.g., automatically requiring a higher majority for constitutional proposals, or slashing malicious proposals.

The Polis DAO is also the umbrella that coordinates the role-based DAOs internally. It can grant autonomy to the micro-DAOs via smart contract permissions. For example, the Polis DAO might hold the master treasury, but allocate budgets to departmental DAOs (role-based DAOs) through on-chain approvals. Thanks to the modular architecture of frameworks like Aragon OSx, one can set up permission hierarchies: the Polis DAO could have the permission to mint or revoke funds to sub-DAOs, but cannot directly spend those funds except via the sub-DAO's rules. This way, local decisions remain local, yet the Polis DAO ensures alignment with the city's broader goals.

Crucially, the Polis DAO provides **transparency** at scale: “everything from budget allocations to law changes is recorded on an open ledger”, visible to all citizens in real-time. This real-time accountability is a leap beyond traditional governments where budgets can be opaque. In a Polis DAO, any attempt to divert resources or make a decision without approval is simply not possible – the smart contract either doesn’t allow it or such a transaction would show up publicly, alerting the community. By having all significant governance actions go through the Polis DAO, we fulfill the ideal of a transparent, accountable republic in which citizens truly have the final say.

## Inter-Polis DAOs for Global Coordination

No Polis is an island. While each city-state DAO governs locally, many challenges – pandemics, climate change, trade, peacekeeping – are global. The POLIS framework introduces **inter-Polis DAOs** to manage coordination at regional and global levels. One can imagine a “*League of Polises*” or **Global Council DAO** where each member Polis is represented. This Global DAO is essentially a DAO of DAOs: each Polis might send a *delegate* (which could be an elected human or even an AI agent acting on the Polis’s behalf) to participate in the global deliberation.

The global DAO’s mandate is limited to *shared issues* – it **does not control local matters** or infringe on a Polis’s sovereignty. Instead, it focuses on tasks like organizing inter-city emergency response (e.g., if one city suffers a natural disaster, the global DAO can coordinate aid from others), maintaining global protocols (such as climate agreements or open technology standards), and resolving disputes between Polises in a neutral forum. In essence, it acts like a decentralized United Nations or federation council, but with binding smart contracts instead of unenforceable resolutions.

From a technical viewpoint, achieving this in a decentralized way suggests each Polis DAO could be connected via an interoperability protocol (since different Polises might run on different chains or instances). Modern blockchain technology like **Cosmos (IBC)** or **Polkadot (parachains)** can facilitate a network of blockchains where each city has its own chain/DAO, and they communicate through hubs or bridges. For example, if each Polis runs its governance on a local blockchain, a global “hub” chain could run the global DAO, and Polises could send cross-chain messages (perhaps via a token or credential representing their vote) to that hub. This ensures *seamless collaboration without requiring a single world government or chain*.

An alternative implementation is to keep it all on one chain but segregate by DAO instances. Frameworks like Aragon or DAOstack allow multiple DAO organizations on the same network; a global DAO could simply be another organization where each Polis’s wallet/address has a membership token. The key is that membership in the global DAO is at the *Polis* level (one Polis, one vote, for instance, or weighted by population – those rules can be encoded as desired). This means human citizens don’t directly vote in the global DAO; their Polis’s delegate or aggregated decision does. It’s a *federated model*, similar to how Rojava’s democratic confederalism created networks of councils from the village level up to cantons and a federation. Indeed, Abdullah Öcalan’s vision of democratic confederalism – “a network of autonomous municipalities and councils cooperating for common causes, without a coercive central state” – aligns closely with what POLIS attempts via blockchain DAOs.

Security and trust in the global DAO are bolstered by the blockchain’s neutrality. Since no single Polis can control the ledger, agreements made in the global DAO (like resource sharing compacts) are automatically enforced by code. For example, if Polises vote to contribute 1% of their surplus energy to a global green energy fund, smart contracts could escrow those contributions from each Polis’s treasury and allocate funds to projects per the agreed rules. This removes the need for a centralized enforcer; the code *is* the enforcer.

Finally, the global DAO can also serve as a knowledge hub. It could maintain the **global law repository** (discussed in the next section) and track which Polis has adopted which laws or standards. It becomes a ledger of *governance data* at the civilizational scale – a living record of how our global network of city-states evolves rules over time. Each change, each fork, each merge of law in the repository is timestamped on this DAO's chain, creating an immutable history of governance evolution.

## Onboarding New Polises via a DAO Process

As the POLIS network expands, new communities (perhaps an existing town transitioning to a Neo-Polis, or a newly founded city) will want to join. Onboarding these new Polises should itself be handled through a decentralized, transparent mechanism – an **Onboarding DAO** or an *admissions process* encoded in smart contracts. This ensures that entry into the network isn't arbitrary or politicized, but based on agreed criteria and collective decision.

**Onboarding Workflow:** When a prospective Polis wants to join, it would initiate a request to the Onboarding DAO (which could be a subset of the global DAO or a dedicated committee with representation from existing Polises). The request might include the new community's charter, proof of meeting baseline requirements (e.g., a commitment to core principles like human rights, a functional local DAO governance structure, etc.), and any resources needed or offered. This is akin to submitting a pull request to join a network. The Onboarding DAO smart contract would then trigger a structured review process:

1. **Verification Phase:** Existing members of the Onboarding DAO (representatives of current Polises) verify the credentials and preparedness of the applicant. This might involve off-chain steps like sending observers or running test scenarios, but the results (e.g., a report or attestation) can be anchored on-chain for transparency. For example, a requirement might be that a new Polis has a functioning city DAO with at least 1000 participants – an existing Polis could cryptographically attest that they've seen this in action.
2. **Deliberation Phase:** A proposal is created on the Onboarding DAO's platform detailing the new applicant's profile and the terms of admission (if any). Members discuss this proposal in an open forum (possibly off-chain like a discussion board, but linked). This could also include negotiating conditions: e.g., the new Polis might need mentorship from an established Polis, or maybe a gradual integration plan.
3. **Voting Phase:** The existing Polises vote on whether to admit the new member. This could be a simple majority or a higher bar, depending on policy. It might also be weighted by some measure (like larger Polises having more weight, though one could also argue for one-Polis-one-vote to keep equality). The voting is executed through the Onboarding DAO smart contract, ensuring tamper-proof tally and quorum enforcement. If approved, the contract automatically flags the applicant as an official member. If rejected, the contract could allow re-application after a waiting period or after certain criteria are met.
4. **Integration Phase:** Upon approval, smart contracts could automatically perform integration tasks: add the new Polis's representative to the Global Council DAO with appropriate rights, include the new Polis in global resource allocations or communication channels, and perhaps trigger a funding mechanism (for example, a joining grant from a global fund to help the new Polis get started). The new Polis might also fork the global law repository at this point as a starting template for their local laws (see next section).

The entire onboarding is thus *governed by code*: no secret ballots, no closed-door diplomacy. All decisions and their rationales are recorded. This not only ensures fairness, but also creates a knowledge base for future onboardings (lessons learned from each case, visible to all).

From a UX perspective, joining the POLIS network via the Onboarding DAO should be as straightforward as possible. Ideally, a web interface (dApp) guides the applicant through preparing their proposal, with checklists for requirements and fields for necessary data. For the existing members, their interface would show pending applicants, allow them to review documentation, and cast votes. Good UX here is crucial: if it's too cumbersome, busy city administrators (or AI agents governing a Polis) might not engage fully. As Aragon's team learned, *great user experience is crucial* for enabling healthy participation in governance. Thus, incorporating tutorials, tooltips, and simulations in the onboarding dApp (for example, showing a mock vote outcome or impact) can improve decision quality and confidence.

One might ask: could a hostile or incompatible entity force its way in? The DAO mechanism prevents that – unless the existing Polises vote them in, they stay out. Conversely, could the existing Polises become cliqueish and block worthy new members for selfish reasons? Possibly, but since POLIS's ethos is expansion and collaboration, the governance policies can include **inclusivity** metrics (for instance, requiring a justification if rejecting an applicant, and possibly an override mechanism if a majority of *citizens across all Polises* want a certain community included). The code could integrate such checks, although such features must be designed carefully to avoid Sybil attacks (fake communities trying to join, etc.). Self-sovereignty implies each Polis ultimately decides whom they federate with, but the transparent process ensures they decide based on merits, not prejudice, under the eyes of the whole network.

In summary, the onboarding DAO model treats *network admission as a decentralized, procedural governance action*. It aligns with POLIS's value of voluntary association: communities join by consensus and shared values, not by coercion. Technically, this is implemented via multi-sig or token-based voting contracts, with off-chain data oracles as needed (e.g., to verify population counts or compliance). By the time a new Polis is onboarded, it has already engaged in a mini instance of decentralized governance – a fitting rite of passage for joining a DAO-governed civilization.

## Legislative Forking: Open-Source Law Repositories

One of the most innovative aspects of POLIS governance is treating **laws as living documents**, maintained much like open-source software code. Instead of static law books updated only by slow parliamentary processes, POLIS envisions a **global law repository** – an open-source collection of legislation and policies. Each Polis can **fork** this repository to create its local law code, just as a developer might fork a software project. Changes to laws are proposed, discussed, and merged using a **pull request-style mechanism**, with the global repository recording all history of governance evolution.

This approach brings the powerful paradigm of distributed version control (e.g., Git) to legislation. In fact, the idea that *"laws are open source; free to fork"* has already been suggested in tech-forward governance discussions. Consider how Dubai adopted aspects of British common law for its financial center – essentially "forking" London's legal code as a base. POLIS takes this further by making the process digital and collaborative across all Polises.

**Global Law Repository:** Technically, this could be a Git repository (on a platform like GitHub/GitLab or a decentralized alternative) containing documents or code that represent laws. For human readability, laws could be written in Markdown text, perhaps with structured formatting. For machine



enforcement (in certain cases), some laws might also have smart contract representations or parameter sets (e.g., a tax law could have a smart contract that implements the tax logic). The repository is the “master branch” of civilization’s legal knowledge.

**Forking and Customization:** When a Polis is formed or when it updates its charter, it forks the global repository. This creates a copy that the Polis can modify to suit local needs – for example, adding a bylaw unique to its culture, or choosing one of several model policies for an issue (like selecting a specific education policy out of multiple global suggestions). This is akin to how Linux distributions share a kernel but have different configurations. The act of forking is transparent; everyone can see that Polis X’s law repo diverged from the global baseline at certain commits.

**Proposing Changes (Pull Requests):** If a Polis innovates a new law or improves an existing one, it can propose this change upstream. For instance, Polis A develops an effective policy for community policing that reduces conflict. They commit the policy text (and any accompanying smart contract code) to their fork. They then open a “pull request” to the global repository, with an explanation of the change and the results it achieved. Other Polises (maintainers of the global repo, so to speak) review this proposal. This review happens in the open: experts, citizens, and AI advisors can comment just like developers comment on code changes. The proposal might be refined through iterative feedback.

**Voting and Merging:** The decision to merge a legislative pull request could be made by the **Global Council DAO** or a specialized **Legislative DAO** comprising legal experts/delegates from each Polis. Essentially, instead of a single maintainer deciding like in a software project, it’s a decentralized decision: do we adopt this law into the global canon? The Legislative DAO might use a weighted voting (perhaps larger populations have more say, or just one vote per Polis for simplicity). If the vote passes, the pull request is merged – the law change becomes part of the global repository. Polises that want to stay synced can pull these changes into their local fork if applicable. If a Polis disagrees, it is not forced – it can maintain a different version in its fork (with the understanding it might lose some interoperability or mutual recognition from others on that particular issue).

**Versioning and History:** Every change is recorded with timestamp, proposer, and diff. This means there is a clear history of how a law evolved – “governance commits” over time. Citizens or researchers can browse this history to see, for example, why a certain regulation was introduced (the discussion thread serves as legislative history). This could solve a common problem in law: figuring out legislative intent or tracking amendments becomes as easy as checking commit logs. The global law repository thus acts as *collective memory* of governance.

To support this system, emerging tools like **Governance for Git (Gov4Git)** are highly relevant. The concept behind Gov4Git is to automate governance processes using Git as the substrate. Frameworks are being developed to standardize this: one example is a generic framework for building governance applications on Git, automating common tasks like managing proposals and tracking changes. Such a framework could be integrated so that whenever a pull request is opened, it automatically creates a corresponding proposal in the Legislative DAO for voting, and when merged, triggers notifications to all Polis DAOs.

**Benefits of Legislative Forking:** This system encourages *experimentation and rapid improvement* in governance. Polises become like labs trying out policies; successful ones propagate to others. It also respects *local autonomy* – you can diverge if you truly want a different path, but you share a common baseline that facilitates cooperation. Think of it as maintaining compatibility: just as open-source projects benefit from shared protocols and libraries, Polises benefit from shared legal standards while still being free to customize. All Polises collectively maintain the “core” laws (like fundamental rights

maybe, or global environmental protocols) akin to a Linux kernel maintained by thousands of contributors.

This model is transparent by default. All citizens can see proposed law changes and their rationale, much like they can browse open pull requests on an open-source project. It demystifies lawmaking, inviting experts from anywhere to contribute. For instance, a software engineer in Polis B might propose an improvement to data privacy law because they notice a flaw – they don't need to be a politician, just like open-source contributions come from volunteers.

One challenge is ensuring broad participation and not just letting a few technocrats control the repo. This is where the *voting threshold and inclusive processes* in the Legislative DAO matter, as well as providing a good UX for ordinary citizens to follow along. It might be that everyday people won't comment on Git diffs; front-end interfaces could present proposals in plain language, allow people to vote or at least express sentiments, which can then guide the delegates' votes. Education is crucial too, so citizens understand that *forking a law* is not anarchic but a structured way to improve it.

In summary, the legislative forking system marries the agility of open-source collaboration with the rigor of democratic approval. It records governance evolution in an immutable global repository – fulfilling the ideal that laws, like code, should be transparent and continuously improved by the community they serve. As one observer quipped in a Network State forum: in the future, *cities and regions will fork entire legal systems like codebases* – POLIS turns that vision into a working reality.

## Evaluating DAO Frameworks for POLIS Governance

Implementing the above governance model requires robust DAO software frameworks. We evaluate five prominent DAO frameworks – **Aragon**, **MolochDAO**, **DAOstack**, **Gnosis Safe (with Zodiac extensions)**, and **Colony** – against the needs of POLIS: *interoperability* (working across platforms/chains), *self-sovereignty* (autonomy and control for communities), *user experience* (usability for both tech-savvy and lay citizens), and *BPMN compatibility* (ability to map onto process-driven workflows). Each of these frameworks offers unique strengths:

- **Aragon:** A leading platform for creating and managing DAOs with a user-friendly interface and customizable governance modules.
- **MolochDAO:** A minimalist DAO design focused on simplicity and collective funding (notably for grants), known for its “ragequit” mechanism that lets members exit with their share of funds.
- **DAOstack:** A platform emphasizing collective intelligence and scalability through holographic consensus, providing modular governance tools for proposals and voting.
- **Gnosis Safe (with Zodiac):** Originally a multi-signature wallet for secure fund custody, extended by the Zodiac suite to enable DAO-like governance (on-chain execution of Snapshot votes, role modules, etc.).
- **Colony:** A platform geared towards project and team management, featuring reputation-based voting, task allocation, and budget management for decentralized collaboration.

Let's examine each in the POLIS context:

### Aragon

**Overview:** Aragon provides a comprehensive toolkit for building DAOs on Ethereum and Polygon, with a strong focus on ease of use and modularity. The new Aragon OSx is a modular core where functionalities are added via plug-in contracts, making it adaptable to various governance needs.



**Interoperability:** Historically Ethereum-centric, Aragon has expanded to support multiple EVM chains (and Aragon OSx is chain-agnostic to an extent). For inter-Polis usage, Aragon DAOs on different chains would require bridging. However, Aragon's support for common standards means an Aragon-based DAO in one Polis can interoperate via cross-chain messaging if needed. Also, broadly speaking, the trend is that "DAO frameworks are becoming more modular, extensible and interoperable". Aragon exemplifies this with its plugin architecture which could allow integration with other protocols (e.g., integrating a Polkadot-based Polis by writing a plugin that reads Polkadot messages).

**Self-Sovereignty:** Aragon is open-source and allows communities to fully control their DAO contracts. Once a Polis deploys an Aragon DAO, it is owned by the community's keys; no central Aragon authority can shut it down or change its rules. This aligns with self-sovereignty – the Polis DAO is self-governed on a public blockchain, and thanks to Aragon's permission system, no outsider can arbitrarily intervene. One consideration is Aragon's use of an external **Aragon Network DAO** for things like Aragon Court (dispute resolution); if a Polis relies on Aragon Court, they are trusting a broader network. But participation is optional. A truly self-sovereign Polis might choose to run its own instance of a court or avoid that module.

**UX:** Aragon has one of the most polished user experiences in the DAO space. The Aragon App (web interface) walks users through DAO creation in minutes, and provides a clean dashboard for proposals, votes, and finances. This is critical for POLIS, as many community members may not be crypto-native. Aragon's focus on education and guidance in-app (with tooltips and contextual help for governance settings) has been noted to significantly lower the barrier for new users. In a POLIS deployment, this means citizens could interact with the Polis DAO with minimal training, and role-based DAOs could be easily spun up by non-programmers (e.g., community organizers). The Aragon client is also open for customization – a Polis could white-label it and integrate their own branding to make the experience feel native to their community.

**BPMN Compatibility:** While Aragon doesn't natively understand BPMN, its modular nature and **permission management** can approximate process flows. For instance, using Aragon's **ACL (Access Control List)**, one could set that "Action X can only be executed if Proposal Y was approved" – linking steps in a workflow. Also, Aragon plugins could potentially be written to enforce sequences or conditional logic reflecting a BPMN diagram (e.g., a plugin that represents a multi-step approval workflow). The challenge is that complex workflow logic might require writing custom plugins or using an external orchestration layer. That said, Aragon's emphasis on **clarity and simplicity** might encourage us to *simplify processes* into modular votes rather than mirror every BPMN gateway on-chain (which could get cumbersome).

**Conclusion on Aragon:** It's a strong candidate for Polis-level DAOs due to its user-friendliness and flexible governance features. It's already used by many major DAO projects, proving its reliability. The new Aragon OSx's design of a lean core with pluggable governance logic is forward-looking and matches POLIS's need for adaptability – we can tailor each Polis's DAO with specific plugins (like a quadratic voting module, a budgeting module, etc.) and upgrade or remove them as needs evolve. Aragon's focus on improving UX and reducing complexity resonates with the need to include all types of users in governance.

## MolochDAO

**Overview:** MolochDAO is famed for its minimalism – the original Moloch V1 (launched in 2019 for funding Ethereum 2.0 grants) had a straightforward model: members join by contributing funds, they get voting shares, proposals typically deal with funding requests or adding members, and any member can **ragequit** (leave and withdraw a proportional share of treasury) at any time before a

proposal they don't like executes. This "minimum viable DAO" design inspired many forks (like MetaCartel, RaidGuild, and DAOhaus's framework). Moloch V2 added some improvements (like guild kick to remove bad actors, and more proposal types), but it remains lean.

**Interoperability:** Moloch contracts are EVM-based and have been deployed on various networks (Ethereum mainnet, xDAI/Gnosis Chain via DAOhaus, etc.). They are not inherently cross-chain – each Moloch DAO is a silo. For POLIS, one could deploy a MolochDAO for each small group or project (it's quite suited for **Resource Allocation DAOs** or grant committees inside a Polis). However, coordinating multiple Molochs (like in a global federation) would be manual or require a meta-layer. There is no built-in cross-DAO communication. On the plus side, the simplicity means it's unlikely to conflict with other systems, and one could integrate it into a larger process by treating a Moloch vote result as a trigger for other contracts.

**Self-Sovereignty:** Moloch's code is extremely simple, which actually enhances autonomy – there's just not much that can be interfered with. Each DAO is entirely controlled by its members. The **ragequit** mechanism is a key to self-sovereignty at the individual level: if you disagree with the direction, you can exit with your share, so you're never economically coerced to stay under majority decisions. From a community perspective, a Moloch DAO has no dependency on any external token or protocol (no "DAO token" governance beyond itself), so it's very self-contained. One trade-off is that Moloch lacks on-chain enforcement of anything beyond funding – it doesn't directly manage complex rules or tasks. But as a financial primitive (treasury + group voting), it gives communities a lot of sovereignty over pooled resources.

**UX:** The original Moloch contracts had no official user interface aside from Etherscan or rudimentary dApps, which made it hard for non-technical users. However, projects like **DAOhaus** built friendly UIs that let you deploy a Moloch DAO and manage proposals without coding. Still, compared to Aragon, the features are bare-bones (which is by design). For example, Moloch doesn't natively support different voting types or multiple proposal categories – everything is a generic proposal with yes/no votes. This simplicity can be a plus (less to learn) but also a minus (less guidance). For POLIS, Moloch might be used in contexts where the user group is small and focused (so they can be trained easily) or where the stakes are lower (so a mistake in usage isn't catastrophic). If used for a city-wide DAO, Moloch's simplicity might prove too limiting (no built-in role permissions, no modular apps). But for a **Commons Contribution Funding DAO** that just gives grants, Moloch's straightforward proposal->vote->fund flow could be very effective. The UX there is basically a list of proposals and a vote button – simple enough for most after minimal onboarding. The presence of DAOhaus as a ready-made interface means we have something to start with.

**BPMN Compatibility:** MolochDAO is not process-oriented; it's more of a single decision loop repeated: submit proposal -> vote -> execute (or fail) -> allow ragequit in between. If we needed to implement a BPMN-modeled workflow using Moloch, we'd likely need off-chain orchestration or conventions. For example, if a BPMN process has sequential approvals, one could model each approval as a separate Moloch proposal, but there's no way to enforce order except socially or via a wrapper contract. So Moloch is best for atomic decisions (particularly funding decisions). It doesn't map neatly to multi-step workflows without customization.

**Conclusion on MolochDAO:** In the POLIS framework, Moloch-style DAOs might serve as *sub-DAOs for specific purposes*, especially funding pools. Their lean design ensures low gas costs and fewer attack vectors, which is attractive for small budgets. They also exemplify the principle of voluntary association strongly via ragequit. But for full-fledged governance (like writing laws or managing a city's operations), Moloch alone is insufficient. One could imagine each Polis having a Moloch DAO for its community treasury (where citizens donate or pay dues and then collectively fund local projects),

as this plays to Moloch's strengths: grant-making and preventing minority oppression (because minorities can exit). Moloch's ethos of simplicity also reminds us not to over-engineer governance – sometimes a straightforward yes/no vote on spending money is all that's needed to decide a local issue.

## DAOstack (Alchemy)

**Overview:** DAOstack is a modular DAO framework that introduced the concept of **Holographic Consensus** to address scalability in decision-making. Its flagship application, Alchemy, was used by communities like Genesis DAO. DAOstack DAOs revolve around a GEN token (for staking on proposals) and the idea of “boosting” proposals: anyone can stake GEN on proposals they think are important; if a proposal gets enough stake, it enters a boosted state where it's decided by a relative majority of those who vote, rather than needing a full quorum. This allows many proposals to be processed in parallel without overwhelming voters – only a subset get boosted for attention.

**Interoperability:** DAOstack was originally built for Ethereum, and the GEN token and contracts are on Ethereum. However, the principles can be carried to other platforms, and indeed we see new frameworks (like **DAOstack's Arc** being adapted or influencing others). The WEF DAO Toolkit noted that DAO frameworks are increasingly developed beyond Ethereum, on Polkadot, Cosmos, Solana, etc.. While DAOstack itself didn't become multi-chain widely (partly as the ecosystem moved on to other tools), the idea of *interoperability* here might be more about conceptual interoperability: the ability to plug into other tools. DAOstack's focus was governance logic; one could integrate its voting mechanism into communities with different collaboration tools. For POLIS, if one needed the holographic consensus mechanism, you could potentially port the contracts to a different chain or incorporate similar staking concepts in another framework. In practice, for direct use, an Ethereum sidechain (like xDAI) was used by some DAOstack DAOs, which shows some flexibility.

**Self-Sovereignty:** A DAOstack DAO is self-governed by its members with on-chain proposals, but one critique is the reliance on the GEN token and the global DAOstack ecosystem. If a Polis used DAOstack and the GEN token for proposal boosting, it's inviting speculators or external holders of GEN to have influence (since anyone could stake on proposals to boost them). In a POLIS context, that could be a concern – you might not want an external token economy interfering with local governance. However, you can customize the token or parameters. DAOstack's architecture (Arc and ArcJS) is open-source, so a community could deploy their own instance of the contracts and even have their own staking token if needed, which would mitigate external dependency. So, sovereignty is achievable but requires careful deployment choices. The DAO's own voting power can still be confined to citizens.

**UX:** Alchemy (the UI for DAOstack) provided a web interface where proposals are listed with their stakes and votes, and users could stake GEN or vote. It was functional but perhaps not as slick as Aragon's interface; also the concept of proposal boosting is more complex for average users to grasp. In user testing, many found it confusing why some proposals pass with lower turnout (because they were boosted) and others fail (because they weren't boosted or reached expiration). For a POLIS, this added complexity might raise a barrier – it demands user education on how the governance process works under the hood. There is power in it (it enables large groups to manage lots of proposals), but the *great UX challenge* is significant. If Aragon emphasizes simplicity, DAOstack historically embraced complexity for the sake of scale. A middle-ground approach could be to use some of DAOstack's concepts behind the scenes while simplifying the presentation to users. For example, a POLIS app could just say “this proposal is in fast-track mode because it gained support from a prediction market” instead of explaining staking ratios. In any case, if an advanced POLIS or an inter-Polis council had very heavy governance throughput, DAOstack's model is worth considering for efficiency.

**BPMN Compatibility:** DAOstack could handle different proposal types via its **scheme** mechanism (Arc allowed installing different governance modules). In theory, one could map different parts of a process to different scheme contracts – e.g., a voting scheme for general proposals, a budget scheme for funding proposals, etc. But orchestrating them in a BPMN sequence would be a challenge. There wasn't a direct way to enforce sequence aside from having proposals that trigger other proposals. One intriguing aspect is that the staking mechanism in DAOstack could be seen as a parallel to BPMN's event mechanisms (it's like a way to prioritize tasks). But overall, using DAOstack doesn't inherently solve process flows; one would still need to design those flows at a higher layer.

**Conclusion on DAOstack:** It's an ambitious framework that tried to solve "too many cooks" problem in DAOs by introducing an economic signal (staking) to surface good proposals. For a global POLIS network where potentially *thousands of proposals* could be flying around (imagine all Polises submitting ideas to a global repository), something like holographic consensus might be useful so that only those proposals deemed valuable by attention (stake) get the global vote. In that niche – high-volume proposal environments – DAOstack's approach might shine. However, its relative decline in popularity (compared to simpler Snapshot-based off-chain voting, for instance) suggests that complexity was a barrier. From an implementation perspective, one might harvest ideas from DAOstack (or even integrate parts of it into Aragon via plugins) rather than using it wholesale in 2025. It's noteworthy that new frameworks like **Snapshot + Safe** or **Tally** focus on simplicity and off-chain efficiency, whereas DAOstack was fully on-chain and economic. For POLIS, a hybrid approach might be best: e.g., off-chain signaling (like conviction voting or polling) to narrow down proposals, then on-chain binding votes for final decisions – achieving the intent of holographic consensus with potentially simpler tools.

### Gnosis Safe (Multisig with Zodiac)

**Overview:** Gnosis Safe is widely used as a secure crypto wallet requiring multiple signers (multisig). By itself, a Gnosis Safe is not a full DAO (there's no concept of proposals and voting periods – the signers just approve transactions). However, the **Zodiac** suite (developed by Gnosis Guild) transforms Safes into DAO components by adding modules: for example, the **Reality Module** allows off-chain Snapshot votes to trigger on-chain Safe actions via the Reality.eth oracle, and the **Roles Mod** allows setting role permissions on Safe operations. Essentially, a Safe with Zodiac modules can emulate many DAO governance patterns, with the Safe acting as the treasury and executive and Snapshot as the deliberative body.

**Interoperability:** Safe contracts are available on many EVM-compatible networks (Ethereum mainnet, Polygon, BSC, Arbitrum, Optimism, etc.), which already makes it easy to have Polises on different chains using the same wallet standard. There's also ongoing work on Safe messaging that could link Safes across chains (though not trustlessly yet). The nice thing is Safe is quite *composable* – other tools integrate with it (e.g., DeepDAO for analytics, SafeSnap for voting, DAOhaus can even manage a Safe). So it scores high on interoperability in practice: it's becoming a universal primitive for DAO treasury and execution. For a POLIS, one could have each DAO's funds in a Safe and then if a global project DAO is needed, you could even make a Safe where each Polis Safe is one signer (although that might be cumbersome, it's possible).

**Self-Sovereignty:** Gnosis Safe is non-custodial and permissionless – the users (signers) fully control it. By adjusting the signer set or threshold, the community manages its security. With Zodiac modules, there is a bit of reliance on external infrastructure: e.g., Snapshot for votes, Reality.eth oracle for verification. Those introduce some trust assumptions (Snapshot votes are off-chain, so you trust the Snapshot servers or IPFS; Reality.eth introduces a potential oracle delay or attack if not properly set). However, you can mitigate these (like using multiple oracles or time delays to catch fraud). In terms of

sovereignty, a Polis using a Safe plus Snapshot effectively controls its fate (since it sets the rules on who can vote and how many votes enact a transaction). There isn't a centralized party that can override a Safe – it's just code and the key holders.

One caution: because the Safe doesn't inherently enforce any particular voting rule (that's all up to modules or off-chain), one must carefully configure it to enforce the will of the DAO. For example, if a Safe is 3-of-5 multisig of community-elected signers, then those 5 could collude and ignore Snapshot votes unless you have the Reality module enforcing it. So, to be truly autonomous, you'd want the Safe's execution to be bound to your DAO votes (through Zodiac). When done, you get a very robust setup: off-chain proposals for cheapness + on-chain enforcement for security.

**UX:** Gnosis Safe's web interface is excellent for managing a wallet – but it's aimed at the signer experience, which is more technical (signing transactions, etc.). A regular citizen wouldn't directly use the Safe interface; instead, they'd use a front-end like Snapshot (which feels like a simple voting app where you click choices) or a bespoke UI that the POLIS provides. Snapshot itself is user-friendly for voting – many crypto communities use it seamlessly by connecting a wallet and clicking vote. For POLIS, one might integrate Snapshot into a broader civic app (perhaps even abstracting the crypto parts so users log in with an ID and vote without dealing with keys each time, while still signing under the hood). The Safe > Snapshot architecture decouples the treasury and voting UI, which is flexible but means there's two interfaces to manage. The Zodiac tools aren't all plug-and-play yet for novices; setting up a Reality module requires some comfort with contracts. But once set up, participation is straightforward: propose on Snapshot, vote, and if passed, the transaction auto-executes from the Safe after the oracle confirms the vote result.

One potential snag is if we want complex workflows (like multi-step approvals) – Snapshot basically handles singular proposals, not sequences. But you could make one Snapshot strategy depend on multiple questions (there are advanced plugins for conditional proposals). It's evolving. In terms of accessibility, requiring users to have wallets to vote is a known UX hurdle, but solutions like integrated key management or mobile apps can help. Given that “poor UX significantly limits who can participate in web3 governance”, a Safe + off-chain voting approach tries to give the best of both: it leverages easy off-chain UX and ensures on-chain trust. It will be important to hide complexity (like telling users their vote will later execute a Safe tx via an oracle – they might not need to know that if it always just works).

**BPMN Compatibility:** On the execution side, a Safe can be seen as a generic actor that can perform many kinds of transactions if authorized. With roles modules, you can specify that certain actions require certain conditions. This can mimic process constraints – for example, you could say “payments above 1000 require approval by Finance Committee”, and using Roles mod, any transaction over 1000 DAI could be restricted to require additional signer or a different module. While not exactly BPMN, it is setting business rules in the contract. A BPMN-modeled approval chain (say manager -> finance -> director) could in theory be encoded by a combination of threshold and role restrictions in a Safe, or by chaining multiple Safes (though that gets convoluted). More realistically, one would handle processes off-chain using a process management tool, and just use the Safe as the final executor when all conditions are met (perhaps triggered by an oracle when the BPMN workflow reaches an end event). Gnosis Safe is flexible enough to integrate into such a pipeline; for instance, an external system could automatically craft a Safe transaction when a workflow finishes, then use a signer bot or module to execute it once consensus (through the workflow) is reached.

**Conclusion on Gnosis Safe:** Rather than a full DAO framework, Safe provides the *glue* for secure execution and treasury management, which nearly any DAO will need. In POLIS, we might use Safe as

the backbone for handling funds and enacting decisions (like changing a parameter, upgrading a contract, etc.), while the actual decision process might be managed by Snapshot or other modules. The combination of Safe + Snapshot has become a de facto standard for many DAOs because it balances security and convenience. For a city context, where funds and decisions have real impact, having that multi-signature security (versus just a single admin key) is crucial to avoid single points of failure. And the modularity means we can evolve the governance: we could start with a simple multisig (perhaps in early stages of a Polis with a few founders), then gradually decentralize by moving to Snapshot votes controlling the Safe, and later even fully on-chain governance as the community grows confident. Safe allows this gradual transition by adjusting signers and modules, exemplifying *future-proof flexibility*. Its wide adoption also means lots of tooling and community support – important for longevity.

## Colony

**Overview:** Colony is a platform aimed at enabling online communities to structure their work and rewards without strict hierarchies. It introduced the concept of “**domains**” (sub-organizations or departments within a DAO), **tasks**, **reputation** (earned by completing tasks or being paid in the system), and a token for economic flows. Colony’s model is more work-oriented, making it somewhat akin to a project management tool fused with a DAO. Members can create tasks, assign themselves or others, stake tokens to object to actions they think are wrong, etc. It’s designed to distribute decision-making: people with more reputation in a domain have more influence over decisions in that domain.

**Interoperability:** The current Colony Network operates on xDAI (Gnosis Chain) to minimize fees, though they had Ethereum deployments in the past. They are EVM smart contracts, so could deploy on other EVM chains if needed. Colony doesn’t natively integrate with other DAO frameworks (it’s somewhat all-encompassing in itself), but one could use external tools with it (e.g., a Colony could still hold funds in a Safe if desired, or use Snapshot if they wanted alternative voting). Colony’s strength for POLIS might be in internal management rather than cross-DAO interoperability. However, since POLIS architecture is modular, one Polis might choose Colony as their internal system while another chooses Aragon – they can still collaborate at the global layer if needed by standardizing on key points (like both will respect decisions of a global Snapshot or something).

**Self-Sovereignty:** Colony is open-source and once a community deploys their Colony, they control it via their token and reputation. The architecture is such that the Colony can even continue without its native token if set to use ETH or xDAI for payments. One concern is that Colony contracts were quite complex, and the Colony Network had an overseer for upgrading the system. In a fully self-sovereign approach, a Polis might deploy its own instance of the Colony contracts (not rely on a shared network). But using the common network is easier and still decentralized (the network is decentralized to an extent; however, upgrades might be managed by the Colony team’s DAO at the moment). Assuming maturity by 2025, Colony should allow communities to operate independently with minimal outside interference. The **reputation system** is something to highlight: it’s off-chain (to allow frequent updates without gas) but anchored by on-chain mechanisms. That means trust in an off-chain process (the Colony server or client computing reputation). This is a trade-off for scalability. Self-sovereignty of the community is intact (no external party can take their funds or force tasks), but they rely on Colony’s logic for internal governance. If that logic had a bug or if the community wanted to customize it, they’d need development effort.

**UX:** Colony’s approach tries to mimic familiar project management tools (like Trello or Asana) combined with a treasury. It’s somewhat intuitive for users in that context: you see “domains” which could be like departments (e.g., Infrastructure, Education, etc. for a city), and within those you have tasks or funding decisions. People with skills in those domains do work and get reputation. One



advantage for POLIS: this allows *meritocratic elements* – active contributors gain more say in that domain’s future decisions. That could be very empowering in a city where, say, those who actually build the gardens get more voice in parks & rec decisions. The UI of Colony (as of recent versions) is decent, but not as streamlined for pure governance proposals as Aragon or Snapshot. It’s more of an integrated management tool. For a general city populace, Colony might be a bit overwhelming unless they are actively participating in tasks. Perhaps only certain parts of the community (like committees or guilds) use Colony to coordinate work and budgets, while the broader citizenry still votes on high-level proposals.

One should consider also the learning curve: understanding reputation and staking objections might confuse non-tech users. Colony tries to reduce token-voting plutocracy by using non-transferable rep that must be earned – which aligns with ideals of rewarding contribution over capital. This could be very positive socially (less “wealthy token whales” issue). The UI would need to clearly show why someone has the vote weight they do, etc., to avoid perceptions of unfairness.

**BPMN Compatibility:** Colony’s domain structure could naturally map to lanes in a BPMN diagram (each domain = swimlane). Tasks in BPMN could directly map to Colony tasks. This is perhaps the most intriguing synergy: one could design a BPMN workflow for, say, “Organize City Festival” and then implement it as a series of Colony tasks in an “Events” domain, with each task assigned to people and having budgets. The sequence flow isn’t enforced by Colony automatically, but one can manually follow the plan. Colony doesn’t automate dependency management strongly (though tasks can have prerequisites conceptually). We might utilize Colony’s features to model processes: e.g., a process might correspond to a **Colony project** (they have a concept of “extensions” or maybe an upcoming “program” feature for grouping tasks). Not out-of-the-box BPMN execution, but philosophically aligned: both are about breaking down work and roles.

**Conclusion on Colony:** Colony could serve as the **operational layer** of a Polis, where day-to-day work and budgeting happens in a decentralized way, complementing a higher-level governance layer (like Aragon or Snapshot votes for laws). It brings granularity: instead of every small spending needing a full vote, trusted people in a domain can autonomously do tasks within budgets and only larger allocations bubble up for global approval. This multi-tier governance (global votes for big things, reputation governance for domain things) is actually quite analogous to how city governments delegate responsibilities. For example, the parks department can spend its allotted budget without a citywide referendum on each expense, but if they exceed it or need new policy, it goes to the council. Colony’s framework naturally enforces budget limits and oversight through the token and objection system (any member can object if they think something is out of line, triggering a wider vote).

For implementing POLIS, one might combine Colony and Aragon: use Colony for internal management (tasks, assignments, rewards) and Aragon for enacting official laws and cross-domain decisions. The two can be integrated since Colony can execute arbitrary transactions (via its extension called Funding, I believe) so it could even trigger an Aragon vote or vice versa. If technical integration is too complex, they could run in parallel with some manual coordination.

In summary, **Aragon vs Moloch vs DAOstack vs Safe vs Colony** each cover different needs. A likely POLIS stack might be: **Gnosis Safe** as the secure base (treasury & execution), **Snapshot/Aragon** for citizen voting on proposals, **Colony** for managing projects and work within departments, and maybe **MolochDAO** instances for community funds or special interest groups that want a quick grant mechanism. Interoperability is key: ensuring these components talk to each other or at least don’t conflict. The good news is an increasing trend toward standardization and modularity: DAO frameworks are becoming modular and interoperable, and being developed across chains, which aligns with a multi-chain, multi-tool approach. The focus on **user experience** cannot be overstated:

whichever combination is chosen, it must be packaged in a cohesive UI for users. A citizen shouldn't need to know that behind the scenes one proposal goes to Aragon and another to Colony; the app should route their input to the right contracts. By combining the strengths of these frameworks, POLIS implementers can achieve a balance of *self-sovereignty*, *usability*, and *process alignment* necessary for real-world adoption.

## Technical Architecture & Workflow Patterns

Designing the technical architecture for POLIS DAO governance involves integrating blockchain smart contracts, off-chain services, and front-end interfaces into a seamless whole. In this section, we outline key components and their interactions, supported by architecture diagrams and workflow patterns that illustrate how a proposal or task moves through the system.

*Figure: Multi-layer DAO Governance Architecture — Each Polis operates a local governance stack (combining tools like Aragon/Safe/Colony), and a global DAO (top layer) connects all Polises for inter-city decisions. Arrows indicate flow of proposals and information between layers (e.g., local forked law changes flowing up as proposals to global repo, or global directives flowing down for local implementation).*

**Layers and Components:** As depicted in the figure above, the architecture can be seen in layers (local, city, global) with cross-cutting components for identity and communication:

- **Blockchain Layer (On-chain):** This is where the core smart contracts live. Each Polis may have its own blockchain or use a shared network, but logically each has:
  - **Polis Governance Contracts:** e.g., Aragon DAO contracts or custom governance contracts (voting, token management, permissions).
  - **Sub-DAO Contracts:** e.g., Moloch DAOs for committees, or Colony's set of contracts for domains and tasks.
  - **Treasury Contract:** often a Gnosis Safe or similar, which holds funds and assets, executing transactions per approved proposals.
  - Optionally, **Inter-Polis Contracts:** if using a dedicated chain for global governance, those contracts (e.g., a Global Council DAO contract) reside on that network.
- **Off-chain Layer:** Includes services that assist with governance but are not themselves blockchains:
  - **IPFS/Distributed Storage:** for storing large proposal texts, law documents, media, or BPMN models, ensuring immutability and accessibility for reference.
  - **Snapshot (or Off-chain Voting Servers):** to handle vote counting when using off-chain voting, posting results to an oracle.
  - **Reputation or Oracle Servers:** e.g., for Colony's reputation calculation or for feeding real-world data (like an emergency trigger) into the DAO.
  - **Process Management Tools:** possibly a BPM engine (like Camunda or custom code) that tracks a workflow (especially for emergency response processes or complex multi-step governance) and triggers proposals at certain steps.

- **Notification/Communication Servers:** integration with chat (Matrix/Element, Discord) or civic apps for notifying citizens of new proposals, results, tasks, etc.
- **Front-end Layer (User Interface):** The applications people interact with:
  - **Citizen Governance Portal:** A web/mobile app that surfaces all proposals (local Polis proposals, global proposals, tasks needing volunteers, etc.) in one place. This would unify different backends. For example, it shows a list of proposals with their status whether they are Aragon votes, Snapshot polls, or Colony tasks – the user might not see the difference except maybe via categories.
  - **Administrator Dashboard:** For those in facilitating roles (like a DAO admin or process facilitator), a dashboard to configure settings, initiate the onboarding of new Polises, or manage emergencies.
  - **Visual Process Map:** A UI component that shows a BPMN-like diagram of a governance process (e.g., how a law change goes from local proposal to global approval). Not essential, but helpful for transparency – citizens can click and see “You are here” in the governance process.
  - **Identity/Wallet Interface:** Could be integrated or separate. Ideally, the app has an identity solution (maybe a city digital ID that is linked to a blockchain wallet under the hood) so citizens can sign transactions/votes easily. This could use something like an identity contract or DID (Decentralized ID) that associates a person with a wallet while preserving privacy where needed.

## Workflow Example 1: Local Budget Proposal

To illustrate a typical workflow, consider a **Resource Allocation DAO** scenario where a neighborhood wants funding for a community garden:

1. **Initiation:** A citizen or group submits a budget proposal via the Governance Portal: “Allocate 5000 tokens for Community Garden in District 5”. They fill out a form, attach a PDF or details (stored on IPFS).
2. **Routing:** The portal knows, based on category or rules, that this is a local project funding request. The request is routed to the relevant DAO – perhaps the **District 5 DAO** (if each district has a Moloch or Aragon sub-DAO for participatory budgeting). If District 5 doesn’t have its own DAO, it might route to the citywide Polis DAO with a tag for District 5.
3. **On-chain Proposal Creation:** The app, through web3 calls, creates a proposal in the District 5 DAO’s contract (or posts it to Snapshot for that DAO if off-chain voting is used). The proposal includes the IPFS link to details.
4. **Deliberation:** A notification is sent to District 5 residents (maybe via email or chat integration). They discuss on an integrated forum. The BPMN diagram for participatory budgeting might specify a 1-week deliberation period, which the app enforces by not opening voting until that time passes.

5. **Voting:** When ready, voting opens. Residents vote using their tokens or IDs. Suppose District 5 DAO uses quadratic voting – the portal calculates the quadratic weighting as they vote, showing them the effect. After the vote period (say 3 days), the result is tallied. In this case, assume it passes.
6. **Execution:** Because this is a budget allocation, the DAO contract has an action tied to the proposal – to transfer 5000 tokens from the District budget Safe to the Community Garden Safe (a sub-safe or a vesting contract). Once the vote is successful, either an on-chain contract automatically triggers the transfer (if fully on-chain), or if Snapshot was used, the oracle module (Reality.eth) will detect the “yes” outcome and allow an executor to call the Safe transaction to send funds. The Safe transaction is pre-defined at proposal creation time (this is common in platforms like Aragon and SafeSnap).
7. **Post-Execution:** Funds are now in the Community Garden Safe. Perhaps that Safe is controlled by a small committee of volunteers (they had their own mini-DAO, maybe a 3-of-5 Safe). They can now use it to buy seeds, tools, etc., and periodically report expenses. The main DAO could require them to report (maybe by another proposal to close out the project, or via Colony tasks to track spending).
8. **Feedback and Recording:** The outcome is recorded on the open ledger (transaction logs show the transfer with the proposal ID). The global law repo is not involved because this is an execution of an existing policy (the participatory budgeting policy). However, if someone wanted to analyze, they could see District 5’s budget usage via block explorer or a subgraph. Feedback from the community (was the garden successful?) could be collected for future budgeting decisions.

## Workflow Example 2: Global Policy Fork & Merge

Now consider a complex one: an **Emergency Response DAO** scenario combined with the legislative forking system:

- A climate pattern indicates high wildfire risk across multiple regions. The **Global Council DAO** has a policy for emergency resource sharing (in the law repository, a section on “Disaster Response Protocols”). Polis A, which just experienced a wildfire, realizes the policy doesn’t cover how to allocate *firefighting drones* that some cities have. They come up with an improvement to the policy.
- **Fork & Proposal:** Polis A’s legal team (or AI assistant) edits their fork of the law repository to add “In wildfire emergencies, cities with aerial drones should dispatch them to affected neighboring cities automatically”. They then use the governance dApp to propose this change to the global level. The app might integrate with Git under the hood: it creates a commit diff and opens a pull request on the global law repo (perhaps represented by an IPFS diff or a URL to a GitHub PR if using a public platform). Simultaneously, it creates a proposal in the Global Council DAO referencing this change.
- **Deliberation:** All Polises get notified of a global policy proposal. Because this pertains to emergency response, it might be fast-tracked (maybe only a 48-hour discussion given

urgency). People discuss on an international forum, including experts from each city's emergency services. They reach general consensus that it's good, with minor tweaks.

- **Amendment:** Polis B suggests an amendment (drones should only be dispatched if the requesting city agrees to cover maintenance costs, for fairness). In a Git workflow, they could even commit to Polis A's PR branch or add a comment. In the DAO workflow, perhaps Polis B submits an *amendment proposal*. Depending on the process, the Global DAO might allow friendly amendments without restarting the whole vote (this could be an advanced feature – e.g., an iterative vote or simply withdrawing the first proposal and submitting a revised one quickly).
- **Voting:** The Global Council DAO votes (each Polis has one vote in this scenario). The vote is yes, unanimous.
- **Merge & Record:** The law repository maintainers (which could just be the DAO itself with a bot) merge the change. The global repository now has v1.1 of Disaster Protocol. The Global DAO's action also triggers an update event – Polises receive an alert "Global Law Updated: Disaster Protocol v1.1". Each Polis can choose to pull this update into their local repository. Perhaps the system auto-opens a local proposal in each Polis DAO: "Adopt global protocol update v1.1?". Likely, Polises will approve quickly since it was their reps who agreed globally. However, if a Polis had reservations, they could opt not to merge; their fork would then be divergent and flagged.
- **Execution (Emergency):** Now, when another wildfire hits, the *Emergency Response DAO* (which might be a standing inter-Polis operational DAO) has clear instructions. Possibly an **Emergency Response DAO** is actually an on-chain module triggered by events. For example, an oracle tracking wildfire incidence could automatically ping the Emergency DAO, which then creates spending proposals to deploy resources as per the protocol. Under the new law, it could automatically generate proposals for cities with drones to send them and possibly reimburse costs from a global disaster fund. If this Emergency DAO is composed of representatives from all Polises, they could vote to authorize these actions extremely quickly (or even have pre-authorized it in protocol law to avoid needing a vote each time). The important part is that because the law was updated through the proper process, everyone knows what to do and has consented to the rules beforehand.

This example shows how a legislative change moves from one Polis's idea to global consensus and back to local implementation, with each step transparently logged. The global repository acts like the source code of a program, and the Polises are like nodes running that program, updating it as it evolves.

**Security Considerations:** The architecture must consider security at multiple levels. Smart contracts should be audited and upgradable only via DAO governance (no single key upgrades). Multisig admins might be in place for emergency fixes but under strict social oversight. On the off-chain side, data oracles need to be secured (Reality.eth oracle answers could be gamed – the DAO can set up a security like multiple oracles or time delays for contentious proposals). Identity verification is crucial to prevent Sybil attacks in voting: POLIS might use a proof-of-personhood system or unique ID issuance so one person = one vote (or weighted by stake if that's the model, but likely in city governance one would aim for one person one vote or at least one *credential* one vote to maintain equality). Modern approaches like BrightID or Idena could be integrated for this, or government ID integration in a privacy-preserving way.

**Scalability and Performance:** Using layer-2 solutions or sidechains is important to handle the volume of transactions and votes cheaply. As noted, many DAO frameworks (Aragon, Colony) are deploying on sidechains. The architecture can include a bridge to mainnet if needed for certain assets or to anchor state periodically (for ultimate security, the global law repository hash could be checkpointed on Ethereum mainnet occasionally). Off-chain voting massively scales citizen participation by avoiding blockchain fees for each vote – an essential aspect for a city of tens of thousands voting regularly. The architecture thus leans on off-chain for high-frequency, on-chain for finality and enforcement, which is a pragmatic balance.

**Integration with Legacy Systems:** A POLIS will still interact with the physical world – sensors, IoT, government agencies. The DAO architecture can integrate with those via oracles. For instance, a sensor network for water supply could automatically propose a resource allocation if a drought is detected (IoT device triggers a proposal to import water from another Polis's surplus). Those proposals come in machine-to-machine, and the human governance layer can supervise or veto if needed. Workflow engines might handle the logic, but the DAO provides the trust and transparency.

**Workflow Patterns:** We see a few recurring patterns:

- **Proposal Lifecycle Pattern:** (Idea → Proposal → Vote → Execution → Feedback). This applies to laws, budgets, initiatives. Documenting each stage and ensuring tools exist for each (discussion forums for idea, voting mechanisms, auto-execution integration, and feedback collection surveys maybe).
- **Hierarchy/Federation Pattern:** Local decisions escalate to global if needed (and vice versa, global decisions disseminate down). The pattern uses local DAO → global DAO bridging. That could be implemented by having certain members (delegates) be in both DAOs, or by cross-chain messages. Practically, having human delegates in both might be simplest (each Polis delegate can just create proposals in global DAO as needed).
- **Emergency Fast-Track Pattern:** In urgent scenarios, bypass some steps (or have pre-authorized actions). E.g., a multisig of relevant Polises can act quickly, then retroactively the DAOs approve or review. This is akin to a circuit breaker pattern – coded in smart contracts maybe as a function that can execute with 2-of-3 signatures of affected parties but then requires after-the-fact ratification by the full DAO to remain in effect. This pattern should be used sparingly but is crucial for real-time response (like a hack emergency in a contract or life-and-death disaster response).
- **Continuous Improvement Pattern:** Not a single workflow but the idea that everything (processes, laws, even the DAO code) is subject to iterative improvement via proposals. This is enforced by our legislative repo approach and by open feedback channels. For instance, after each major vote, the system could automatically solicit feedback: “Were you satisfied with the process? any suggestions?” – and that might itself result in governance process tweaks proposed.

In conclusion, the technical architecture of POLIS DAO governance is a tapestry of **blockchain contracts, coordinating services, and user-centric applications**. It strives to be robust (through decentralization and immutability) yet user-friendly (through layering and off-chain optimization). The workflows ensure that whether it's routine local matters or critical global issues, there's a clear path for proposals to be raised, decided, and enacted with accountability at every step. In the next section, we ground this further by diving into concrete use case examples, which will demonstrate these patterns in action within specific domains of community life.



## Use Case Examples of DAOs in POLIS

To make the architecture more tangible, we explore four case examples of DAOs addressing different community needs in the POLIS framework. Each illustrates how the modular governance structure and tools described come together in practice:

1. **Resource Allocation DAO** – managing budgeting and resource distribution in a participatory manner.
2. **Emergency Response DAO** – coordinating rapid, multi-stakeholder actions in crises.
3. **Ancestral Healing DAO** – fostering cultural and historical reconciliation through collective governance.
4. **Commons Contribution Funding DAO** – funding public goods and communal projects with community-driven oversight.

These examples demonstrate the versatility of DAOs: from highly pragmatic functions like budgeting, to sensitive social endeavors like healing historical wounds, there is a pattern of transparent, inclusive decision-making threading through all.

## Resource Allocation DAO (Participatory Budgeting)

In a POLIS, budgets for local projects and public services are not decided solely by a central authority; instead, a **Resource Allocation DAO** engages citizens in budgeting decisions. This could be implemented at various scales – city-wide (for overall budget priorities) or at district/neighborhood level for community grants.

**Scenario:** The city has an annual surplus of 1 million tokens to allocate to community projects (parks, school improvements, startups, etc.). The Polis establishes a Participatory Budgeting DAO where citizens can propose projects and vote on how to distribute funds among them.

**Governance Mechanism:** This DAO might use *liquid democracy* or *quadratic voting* to ensure fair representation of preferences. For example, each citizen gets a certain number of voice credits to allocate across projects, allowing them to signal which projects matter most to them (intensity of preference). Quadratic voting helps counterbalance whales or large districts overshadowing smaller ones by making the cost of heavy influence exponentially higher per additional vote.

### Process:

- **Proposal Stage:** Citizens or civic groups submit project proposals by a deadline, including required budget and expected impact. These are entered into the DAO, likely off-chain first (to gather all proposals) then anchored on-chain once finalized.
- **Deliberation Stage:** Proposals are publicized. Town hall meetings (physical or via VR) and online discussion boards linked to each proposal allow residents to ask questions and give feedback. This stage addresses concerns and refines proposals (some may merge if they're similar, etc.).
- **Voting Stage:** The DAO opens voting. Suppose they use quadratic voting: each citizen has, say, 100 credits that they can spread among proposals (spending credits quadratically: to give 10 votes to one proposal costs 100 credits, leaving none for others, whereas 1 vote costs 1 credit – so it encourages spreading out support). The voting dApp handles the math and provides a friendly UI.

- **Allocation Stage:** Once voting closes, the DAO calculates the winner(s). Maybe it's a funding pool model: the top N projects get funded in full until funds run out. Or it could be proportional allocation: each project gets a share of the 1M based on vote share. The rules are encoded so results can't be tampered with after the fact.
- **Execution Stage:** The DAO (perhaps via a Safe multi-sig controlled by a committee including some citizen reps and city officials) disburses funds to each project's smart contract or escrow. Conditions can be attached – e.g., milestones for projects or refund clauses if project fails to start. The Safe ensures that funds are traceable and only used for the intended purpose (project leads might have to submit expense transactions that the Safe co-signers approve).
- **Transparency:** All proposals and results are open data. Citizens can see exactly how much went to each project and track progress. Public dashboards show metrics like number of voters, distribution of votes (maybe by region or demographic, if known, to ensure broad participation). This addresses common trust issues in budgets – no more “where did our tax money go?”; it's all on the blockchain ledger. Indeed, CityDAO's experiment in land governance hints at how tokenized rights can let stakeholders globally manage resources. Similarly, our Resource Allocation DAO tokenizes the “right to decide on budget” and shares it with all citizens, not just officials.

**Outcome:** Such a DAO can dramatically increase civic engagement and ensure resources align with citizen priorities, enhancing legitimacy of spending. It can start with small portions of the budget and expand as trust in the system grows. By using a DAO, the process is efficient (less bureaucratic overhead, since proposals and voting are handled by software) and inclusive (anyone can propose or support ideas, not just those with political connections). It also acts as a feedback loop: projects funded are essentially those the community believes in, which likely increases volunteer support and successful implementation.

## Emergency Response DAO (Crisis Coordination)

Disasters and emergencies require quick, coordinated action across different agencies and even across Polises. A traditional top-down approach can be slow and mired in red tape. The **Emergency Response DAO** provides a platform where stakeholders – government units, citizen volunteers, other cities, NGOs – rapidly make decisions and allocate resources when crises strike.

**Scenario:** A major flood hits Polis X. Within hours, thousands are displaced. Normally, one might wait for a national government or multiple committees to convene. Instead, the Emergency Response DAO, which is a standing organization of relevant parties (e.g., city's disaster management team, neighboring city liaisons, volunteer orgs, and maybe an AI monitoring system), kicks into action.

**Governance Mechanism:** This DAO likely operates with a blend of automation and multi-sig authority. It might have pre-approved **emergency policies** (as in the law repository) that say “if conditions A, B, C are met, do X, Y, Z.” For instance, if a flood of category 5 occurs, auto-deploy relief fund up to 500k and request 100 personnel from neighbors. These could be coded as conditional proposals – triggered by oracles that monitor weather data or social media reports. The DAO could run on a faster voting cadence (maybe a 6-hour voting window with delegated voting – where each key stakeholder can respond quickly).

**Process:**

- **Detection:** IoT sensors and weather APIs feed data to an oracle. When river levels break a threshold and numerous distress signals appear (perhaps processed by an AI), the Emergency DAO is notified. A proposal is automatically generated: “Declare State of Emergency in Polis X, allocate resources per Protocol section 5.2”.
- **Immediate Execution via Smart Contract:** Some actions can execute immediately if pre-authorized – e.g., releasing a certain amount of emergency funds from an insurance pool, or activating a communication alert system city-wide. Because these steps were agreed in advance in the legislative process, the smart contracts are allowed to do them without a fresh vote (or with a quick multi-sig sign-off). This saves crucial time. As noted, centralized friction in current systems can cost lives, whereas a decentralized but *pre-coordinated* system can respond faster.
- **Human Coordination via DAO:** For other decisions that need human input (like requesting specific aid from neighbors, or imposing temporary evacuation orders), the Emergency DAO’s members convene virtually (the platform could highlight urgent proposals requiring immediate vote). Delegates from surrounding Polises see a proposal like “Polis X requests 20 medical staff and 5 drones from each neighboring Polis, and proposes to compensate via global disaster fund.” They vote within an hour’s time (perhaps a special rule allows one delegate per Polis to vote, quorum being majority of those online). If approved, smart contracts automatically message those cities’ resource management systems (if integrated) or at least create an on-chain mandate.
- **Resource Deployment:** Using IoT and supply chain integrations, the DAO triggers actions: e.g., unlocking a stocked emergency warehouse that is secured by a DAO-controlled smart lock (only opens if DAO signals it), dispatching drones (which might even be autonomous, taking commands from the DAO’s IoT integration), and transferring money to relief organizations. This might seem futuristic, but with blockchain and IoT it’s feasible – a decentralized network can coordinate physical assets if they’re IoT-enabled and trust the DAO’s commands.
- **Community Involvement:** The DAO could also have a public-facing component for volunteers. A separate **volunteer coordination DAO** or simply an interface linked to the emergency DAO allows citizens to offer help (housing, food, labor) and see needs (essentially a decentralized crisis marketplace). The emergency DAO might reward volunteers with tokens or reputation for their contributions, tracked via the system. Everything is recorded so later analysis can improve plans.

**Why a DAO here?** The advantage is **composable trust and speed**. Instead of phoning three government departments and waiting for sign-off, the rules are agreed ahead and encoded. The network of cities forms a mutual aid pact via the DAO, so when one suffers, all respond in a coordinated way without dithering. The Rojava experience with councils in emergency would call a general assembly quickly – here the DAO is that assembly but on steroids (with automated parts and clear triggers). The SpaceDAO initiative example earlier identified how centralization and friction cause up to 80-hour delays in satellite disaster mapping. Our Emergency Response DAO eliminates many manual steps: once conditions are met, it’s *on*. Humans in the loop focus on exceptions and moral judgments (like, do we triage resources to City A or B if both have crises?), rather than on routine decisions.

After the crisis, the DAO can seamlessly scale back – retracting special privileges, summarizing actions taken, and logging expenditures. It provides a transparent after-action report (every transaction is on-chain). That accountability builds trust for next time, and maybe for insurance purposes (global

insurers could trust payouts because they see exactly what was spent). This resonates with the idea that open processes yield greater legitimacy.

## Ancestral Healing DAO (Cultural Reconciliation)

Not all governance is about money or emergencies; some is about intangible but vital community healing and cultural preservation. An **Ancestral Healing DAO** is a more experimental concept where a community collectively addresses historical injustices or trauma – for example, healing the wounds of past conflicts, honoring indigenous practices, or reconciling between former adversarial groups.

**Scenario:** Polis Y has a history where two ethnic communities were in conflict decades ago. There's lingering mistrust and unhealed trauma passed through generations. The city decides to create an Ancestral Healing DAO to guide reconciliation projects, manage related funds (perhaps reparations or cultural initiatives budget), and ensure equal voice of all groups in shaping a harmonious future.

**Governance Mechanism:** This DAO might use **sortition (random selection)** or balanced representation in addition to standard voting, to build trust. For instance, it could have councils chosen by lottery from both communities who then propose initiatives. It could also operate with a **consensus voting** model instead of majority rule for certain decisions, to ensure no group feels overruled. If disagreements occur, it might employ tools like quadratic voting to find common ground or even require facilitated dialogue (with on-chain recorded minutes) before a revote.

### Process:

- **Structure:** Let's say the DAO is structured into two "houses" – Elders Council and Youth Council, each with equal representation from the two ethnic groups. Proposals need approval by both. Smart contracts can enforce that a proposal has two separate voting events (one per council) and only passes if both reach consensus. This mimics a bicameral process but encoded in a DAO.
- **Projects:** The DAO might oversee projects like "Ancestral Storytelling Circles", "Memorial creation", "Joint Cultural Festivals", or recommend policy changes (like renaming a street that had a colonial name).
- **Funding:** The city allocates a certain fund for healing and cultural projects, which the DAO manages (so it's like a specialized budgeting DAO). But beyond money, it's also about decisions like apologies, acknowledgments, or curriculum changes in schools – these are symbolic but powerful actions that the DAO deliberates on.
- **Deliberation:** A key aspect here is that deliberation might need to be *protected and facilitated* more than in other DAOs, due to sensitivity. The DAO could integrate a private but auditable discussion forum where members speak freely, and after reaching understanding, a summary is posted publicly. They might also use tools like **conviction voting** (which lets opinions slowly converge without binary votes until enough support accrues) for proposals that might be hard to decide immediately.
- **Ritual and Integration:** Because this is about ancestral healing, the DAO might incorporate non-Western governance elements. For example, requiring a "ceremony" (which could be a smart contract enforced waiting period plus maybe an actual community ritual) before finalizing a major reconciliation decision. Technically, one could enforce a week of reflection after a vote before execution, giving time for any community member to come forward if they strongly object (like a veto period).

- **Outcome Accountability:** This DAO would measure success in terms of community sentiment improvements (perhaps polled periodically, even via the DAO using a token-weighted survey), and the completion of healing projects. It provides a safe, equitable space to make decisions on matters that otherwise could be contentious. By using a DAO with equal representation and clear rules, it avoids perceptions that one group's political machinery is forcing decisions on another. Everyone can see the fairness: proposals require cross-community support on-chain to pass, which is very concrete evidence of cooperation.

While less “technical” in appearance, such a DAO shows the adaptability of decentralized governance to even emotional and cultural domains. It replaces or complements traditional truth and reconciliation commissions with an ongoing, self-governed process. The transparency can help prevent manipulation: e.g., if funds are for reparations, everyone sees them going to designated programs, not diverted. The records of decisions become part of the historical archive for future generations to see the progress of healing (much as South Africa's TRC had public records, here they are on-chain immutable).

## Commons Contribution Funding DAO (Public Goods)

Public goods (like open parks, free software, education content, climate action) often suffer from underfunding in traditional markets. A **Commons Contribution Funding DAO** aims to incentivize and manage funding for projects that benefit everyone – the “commons”. This is akin to the concept behind Gitcoin or common pool funds, implemented in a local or global Polis context.

**Scenario:** A global Commons DAO is established by the League of Polises to fund projects that no single Polis might fund alone, but that benefit all (for example, an open-source solar energy technology, or a cure for a disease, or even maintaining global open knowledge repositories). Each Polis contributes a bit of its budget to this global commons fund. Citizens can propose projects to receive grants. It's like a decentralized grant-making foundation where all Polises (and their citizens) are stakeholders.

**Governance Mechanism:** Likely **quadratic funding** or **retroactive public goods funding**. Quadratic funding (like Gitcoin grants model) involves matching pools: individual citizens donate small amounts to projects they like, and the DAO's fund matches those donations in a quadratic way (so a project with broad support from many people gets a big match). This encourages lots of people to signal what they value in the commons. The DAO governs the parameters of the matching (how much, any category preferences, etc.) and ensures funds are disbursed as promised. Alternatively, a **retroactive funding** model could be used (like Vitalik Buterin's concept): projects are funded after they show success, based on impact metrics voted on by the DAO.

### Process:

- **Round Setup:** The DAO decides to host quarterly funding rounds focusing on themes (environment, education, etc.). They allocate, say, 500k tokens for the next round as the matching pool.
- **Proposal Submission (Project Registration):** People submit the projects they want to get funded, with descriptions, a funding target, and an address to receive funds. These could be local community initiatives or global open-source projects. The DAO might verify some criteria (non-profit nature, etc.) through a curation committee.

- **Donation Period:** Citizens (from any Polis, or even outsiders if allowed) contribute small donations to the projects they support, via the DAO's platform. Because it's on-chain, every contribution is logged per project. This runs for a set time (e.g., 2 weeks).
- **Matching Calculation:** At the end, the DAO's smart contract calculates matches using quadratic funding formula. For example, if Project A had 100 distinct donors giving total 1000, and Project B had 2 donors giving total 1000, Project A will get a much larger match, reflecting that more people care about it, not just deep pockets. This formula essentially optimizes for *equitable resource utilization* in the commons – broad-based support gets rewarded, which is great for things that many find valuable.
- **Approval and Payout:** The DAO might still put the final list to a governance vote (mostly a formality if rules are clear, but in case someone suspects fraud, they could veto a particular payout). Once approved, funds are automatically distributed to project wallets.
- **Accountability:** As a condition, projects may need to report back or their results are tracked. The DAO could use a **KPI options** or milestone contracts: for instance, pay 50% upfront and 50% after showing a deliverable. The community could vote if a project delivered satisfactorily (like a milestone review DAO vote). This prevents abuse and ensures continuous alignment. However, overhead of too many votes can be streamlined by electing a *Commons Steward Committee* (maybe rotated reps) that does preliminary oversight, only escalating to full DAO if something's contentious.
- **Local Commons DAOs:** Similarly, at Polis level, a Commons DAO might fund local public goods like street art, libraries, or free Wi-Fi. The global one might tackle bigger or more abstract goods (like climate or open-source software used by all Polises).

By funding commons in this way, POLIS incentivizes contribution to things that traditional markets undervalue. It also globalizes the effort: Polises band together to fund, say, a carbon capture tech which, if succeeded, benefits all and perhaps is open licensed for all to use. Each Polis alone might not risk that investment, but collectively, through a DAO that ensures fairness (everyone pays a fair share and everyone gets the benefits), it becomes feasible.

This also democratizes what “commons” are prioritized: citizens literally put money (even small amounts) where their mouth is. If many people in many Polises want more mental health resources, they'll donate to such projects and the match amplifies their voice. It's more direct than waiting for an election on a broad mandate. The DAO can quickly respond to emerging needs (like funding open research on a new virus outbreak).

Real-world analogs like Gitcoin have shown this can mobilize millions for public goods in crypto domain. In a POLIS context, it could be even more powerful because it's not just digital developers but all citizens engaging. The transparency is key to trust: historically, public funds for development often get lost in bureaucracy or corruption. Here, every token's destination is known, and outcomes can be tied back to inputs, strengthening the social contract around public goods.

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These four examples scratch the surface of what's possible. Importantly, they aren't isolated; they can interconnect. For instance, a project funded by the Commons DAO (like a flood early warning system) might feed into the Emergency DAO as a tool. A cultural heritage project funded by Commons might be overseen by the Ancestral Healing DAO to ensure it's done sensitively. The modular DAO framework means each domain can have its own governance optimized for its context, while still plugging into the larger POLIS governance network.



Each example highlights: **clear purpose, open participation, and algorithmic fairness** (quadratic votes, consensus requirements, etc.) as core features. By implementing these, POLIS communities become not only more efficient and resilient, but also more just and inclusive, as people see that *governance is a collective endeavor open to all*, not a distant authority. In the concluding section, we will reflect on implementing such a vision and the path forward for POLIS DAO governance.

## Conclusion and Path Forward

In this extensive guide, we laid out a technical and organizational blueprint for integrating DAO governance into the POLIS civilizational framework. Through a combination of layered DAO structures, innovative governance processes, and carefully chosen frameworks, we see how a network of city-states could govern themselves *by the people* in a direct, transparent, and adaptive manner. From local role-based DAOs executing everyday processes to global councils coordinating on existential challenges, the POLIS model leverages decentralization to make governance both more effective and more legitimate.

This approach is **visionary yet pragmatic**. It draws inspiration from futurist ideas (like open-source law and AI-assisted governance) but grounds them in proven technologies and historical precedents:

- Ancient Greek polis democracy and modern participatory budgeting inform the emphasis on citizen deliberation.
- Rojava's federated councils and the principle of democratic confederalism guide the multi-layer architecture of autonomous but cooperative Polises.
- Blockchain communities' experiments (CityDAO, Gitcoin, Moloch) provide working prototypes of pieces of this puzzle – land governance, public goods funding, minimal governance contracts, respectively.
- The open-source software movement's practices (forking, merging, collaborative review) are repurposed to handle living societal rules.

Implementers looking to deploy these ideas should proceed in phases:

1. **Prototype at Polis Level:** Start with one city or community. Establish a Polis DAO for city governance on a chosen stack (Aragon on xDai, for instance) and identify one or two sub-DAOs to pilot (maybe a budgeting DAO and a volunteer coordination DAO). Run a small participatory budgeting cycle to test the waters. Use this to refine UX and smart contracts with real user feedback.
2. **Integrate BPMN Processes:** Work with city administration to model a couple of internal processes (like business licensing or event permitting) in BPMN, then implement them via DAOs or smart contracts triggers. Even partial automation (like using a DAO vote instead of a committee meeting) can show value. Document how the BPMN-to-DAO translation went to create templates for future processes.
3. **Onboard Additional Polises:** As one Polis finds success, invite others to join the experiment. Use the onboarding DAO model – perhaps initially just an informal coalition, but gradually formalize it. Develop the global law repository and populate it with a draft “Polis Charter” that new members can adopt and fork. This acts as a starter kit of laws and governance modules they can customize.

4. **Launch Global DAO & Commons Initiatives:** Once a handful of Polises are networked, establish the Global Council DAO and perhaps start with a low-stakes global commons project (like a joint cultural festival or an inter-city knowledge exchange program) to test global voting and coordination. This will surface issues in cross-polity voting methods or communication lags, which can then be fixed.
5. **Iterate and Scale:** As more join, governance will need scaling solutions (potentially moving more to off-chain with verification as noted, or introducing hierarchical delegation). Always incorporate the principle from Aragon's learnings: *move from complexity towards simplicity whenever possible*. That means after adding features, see if they can be simplified or if some processes can be automated away to reduce cognitive load on participants.
6. **Legal and Societal Integration:** Work on the interface between these DAOs and traditional legal systems. For now, the DAO decisions might still need to be rubber-stamped by a city council or encoded in law via some translation. Over time, as legal recognition of DAOs improves (maybe via frameworks like the proposed Wyoming DAO LLC laws or others), ensure each Polis DAO has an appropriate legal wrapper so its actions have standing (e.g., a Polis DAO could be the legal equivalent of a city council in some jurisdictions). Also, invest in **education and inclusivity**: train citizens in using these tools, provide support for those without digital access, and guard against the system being captured by a tech-savvy elite. A true POLIS means every citizen, young or old, feels they can meaningfully participate.

Challenges will arise, from technical bugs to cultural resistance. Some people may be wary of "code running society" or distrust the idea of open-sourcing laws. Early successes and transparency will be crucial to win trust. Showing, for instance, that corruption opportunities vanish when budgets are on-chain (because any attempt to mis-spend was visible and stopped) will turn skeptics into proponents through real examples. Emphasize that this isn't removing the human element – rather it's empowering more humans (the whole populace) to be involved, with code just doing the boring bookkeeping and enforcement. The **self-sovereignty** of communities and individuals is enhanced: rules are mutual and no longer imposed from above or manipulated in backrooms.

This journey aligns with a broader shift in the world: people demanding more say in decisions that affect them, and technology enabling new forms of cooperation across borders. The POLIS DAO governance framework is a path to **universal peace and flourishing** envisioned by Jeremy Stein and others – not by naive hope, but by systematically redesigning our governance machinery to reduce conflict (through transparency and fairness), reduce scarcity (through efficient allocation of common resources), and unlock human potential (through inclusive participation and gamified civic engagement, making contribution rewarding).

By weaving together blockchain DAO infrastructure with the societal framework of Polises, we are, in essence, coding the next chapter of human social evolution – one where *the city* (whether a local community or a digital network) is the locus of empowerment, and all cities link arms in a network of knowledge and aid, rather than a Hobbesian competition. It is an ambitious vision, but as this guide has shown, the building blocks are ready to be assembled.

**The path forward is iterative and collaborative:** each implementation will teach new lessons, which can be fed back into the global knowledge commons (via our forking law repository and shared open-source tooling). Mistakes will happen – a DAO might get hacked or a voting mechanism might fail in an edge case – but the community can then patch the code and evolve the governance, much like open-source projects improve over time. Unlike rigid nation-state constitutions, the POLIS governance code is a living document.

In conclusion, the POLIS DAO governance model offers a clear answer to many of today's challenges of governance: *How do we distribute power and decision-making in a complex society?* By modular, multi-layered DAOs that bring decision-making to the most effective level and include those affected. *How do we trust our systems?* By open-sourcing them – “sunlight is the best disinfectant” applied literally to governance. *How do we cooperate at scale?* By networking autonomous units via global protocols – a “League of Polises” bound by smart contracts of mutual aid rather than precarious treaties.

It's a vision where, someday, **the world is one grand Polis – a global city of peace** composed of many communities, as eloquently put in the World Reform whitepaper. We end not with a firm declaration, but with an invitation to innovators, technologists, and community leaders: **take this guide, improve it, implement it in your context, and share back your experiences**. The POLIS future is ours to code – together, let's transform these ideals into a lived reality, step by step, vote by vote, block by block.